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The Straits of Stare Decisis and the Utah Court 
of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of 
Under-Application and the Charybdis 
of over-~~pl icat ion* 
When traveling through the narrow Straits of Messina 
near Sicily, ancient travelers were forced to confront two terri- 
fying creatures. On the one side sat Scylla, a n  enormous sea 
monster, while on the other side sat Charybdis, a giant whirl- 
pool wreaking havoc on ships drawing too near. Unwary mari- 
ners found themselves scudding back and forth between these 
two dangers as they attempted to navigate the strait without 
being seized by either Scylla or Charybdis. Over time, however, 
charts and experience assisted navigators to hold to a center 
course, avoiding both Scylla and Charybdis and the dangers 
they presented. 
Courts adventuring through the straits of stare decisis 
today are  confronted with their own version of that  ancient 
deadly duo: the Scylla of Under-Application and the Charybdis 
of Over-Application. While the Scylla of Under-Application 
snares in  her scaly clutches courts and litigants who carelessly 
displace or disregard prior decisions, the Charybdis of Over- 
Application draws into her swirling maelstrom courts and liti- 
gants who zealously adhere to moribund precedent and whose 
last breath as they descend into the abyss is an invocation to 
Our Lady of the Perpetual Precedent.' 
* B.A., 1991, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., candidate, J. 
Reuben Clark Law School. The author would like to thank Professor David A. 
Thomas, Lisa Joner, Steven Black, and Mary 0. Jensen for their thoughtful 
comments and editorial assistance. The author would also like to express his 
appreciation for comments made by Chief Justice Michael D. Zimrnerman and Veda 
Travis on an earlier version of this paper. Of course, the author takes full 
responsibility for the opinions (and errors) herein. Deo gloria fiat. 
1. Chief Justice Traynor phrased these two different dangers in slightly less 
mythic terms. "If hasty displacement of precedents should be discouraged, there 
should be corresponding discouragement of ritual perpetuation of a moribund prece- 
dent." Roger J. Traynor, Transatlantic Reflections on Leeways and Limits of Appel- 
late Courts, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 255, 263. 
634 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994 
The Utah Supreme Court recently began the process of 
smoothing transit through these straits for Utah courts.' Re- 
sponding to inconsistent applications of the same legal princi- 
ple by the court of  appeal^,^ the supreme court concluded that 
stare decisis required that panels of the court of appeals should 
be mutually bound by the decisions of each other. As the court 
correctly reasoned, misapplication of stare decisis impacts 
equally the values underlying the policy of adhering to prece- 
dent whether a court consists of a unitary bench or of multiple 
panels. Although the supreme court determined that stare 
decisis applied to the court of appeals, it did not analyze the 
doctrine or its application to a multi-panel appellate court. This 
Comment proposes to fill that gap by analyzing stare decisis, 
thereby assisting the court of appeals to avoid the twin evils of 
its misapplication: under-application and over-application. 
Failure to understand stare decisis may lead to two unde- 
sirable ends. First, when a court misunderstands stare decisis, 
it may fail to adhere properly to its prior decisions, producing 
inconsistency in subsequent decisions. This judicial inconsisten- 
cy strikes at the considerations that both support and are pro- 
tected by adherence to precedent: reliance on and stability in 
the law; judicial economy; expeditious litigation; and judicial 
legitimacy. Second, failure to apprehend the values and effects 
of stare decisis may lead a co& to refuse to abandon unjust 
precedents. When a court assumes the straitjacket of prece- 
dent, it abdicates its ability to shape the growth of the common 
law. Moreover, a court declining to overrule erroneous decisions 
may not be able to fully vindicate the rights of parties coming 
before it: Thus, a court must be able to steer between these 
two undesirable results. 
This Comment seeks to aid the Utah Court of Appeals in 
its application of stare decisis. First, the Comment will provide 
an overview of how stare decisis operates, focusing on its appli- 
cation within the setting of a multi-panel intermediate appel- 
2. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
3. See infra part 1I.C. 
4. A court is frequently the only means by which a violated right may be 
vindicated. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy's 
"separate but equal" doctrine); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938) (noting that legislation impacting the political processes or directed 
at "discrete and insular minorities" may receive heightened judicial solicitude); 
Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (adopting the implied warranty of habit- 
ability). 
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late court. Second, the Comment will analyze how the court of 
appeals may limit and overrule its own decisions consistent 
with stare decisis jurisprudence? 
As background for those unacquainted with the Utah Court 
of Appeals, part I1 provides an overview of the court of appeals 
including its history, jurisdiction, and operations, as well as a 
review of its application of stare decisis prior to State u. 
T h ~ r r n a n . ~  Part I11 discusses the doctrine of stare decisis, in- 
cluding the policies underlying adherence t o  precedent. Part IV 
suggests methods permitting the court of appeals to limit and 
overrule former decisions. In part V, this Comment concludes 
that, although one panel of the court of appeals is bound by the 
decisions of another panel, consistent with stare decisis juris- 
prudence, one panel may limit or overrule a decision previously 
rendered by another panel of the court of appeals. 
11. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS 
HISTORY AND TREATMENT OF PRIOR DECISIONS 
A. History 
Until 1987, Utah possessed a bipartite judicial system 
divided between a trial court level, composed of the district and 
circuit courts, and an appellate level, composed solely of the 
state supreme court. Although initially a single appellate court 
had been adequate t o  meet the state's needs, the supreme court 
was unable to keep up with the demands placed upon it as the 
state's population and economy expanded in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. By the mid 1980s, the supreme court had over one 
thousand cases pending on its docket; the length of disposition 
from docketing until issuance of an opinion could be as long as 
seven years.? Responding t o  this crisis in the appellate system, 
the state legislature passed a joint resolution proposing an 
amendment to the Judicial Article of the Utah Constitution 
that would permit the creation of an intermediate appellate 
5. Of course, much of the discussion will be relevant to any court seeking to 
correctly satisfy the demands of stare decisis. However, some of the discussion is 
uniquely addressed to the court of appeals. See, e.g., infia part IV.B.1. 
6. 846, P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
7. See Judith M. Billings, Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1988 UTAH L. 
REV. 149, 150; Norman H. Jackson, The Fifdh Anniversary of the Utah Court of Ap- 
peals, 1992 UTAH BAR J. 18, 19. Today, the average time for disposition is only 
fourteen months. Jackson, supra at 19. Supreme court p e r s o ~ e l  declined the 
author's request for information on how many cases are currently pending before 
the court. 
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court.' The joint resolution was submitted to and approved by 
the citizens in 1984. During the next two years, a judicial task 
force appointed by the governor examined possible methods of 
resolving the appellate ba~klog.~ In 1987, the legislature 
adopted the task force's final proposal and created the Utah 
Court of Appeals. lo 
B. Appellate Operations and Jurisdiction 
The court of appeals, consisting of seven judges, hears all 
cases as three-judge panels." Under the enabling legislation, 
the court lacks authority to hear cases en banc.12 
8. In relevant part the amendment provided that "[tlhe judicial power of the 
state shall be vested in a supreme court . . . and in such other courts as the Leg- 
islature by statute may establish." UTAH CONST. art. VIII, $ 1. The system estab- 
lished in Utah is similar to the federal system in that some courts exist by consti- 
tutional mandate, while other courts exist by mandate of the legislature. See U.S. 
CONST. art. ID. 
9. The task force submitted three possible proposals: (i) expansion of the 
supreme court; (ii) expansion of the supreme court and authorization for it to sit in 
panels; and (iii) creation of a court of appeals. Jackson, supra note 7, at 18. 
10. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-2a-1 (1994). With the creation of the court of ap- 
peals, Utah became one of 37 other states to have an intermediate appellate court. 
In order to provide a flexible court that would be responsive to changes in the 
appellate system, the legislature created a hybrid appellate court that was neither 
wholly a "pour over" court nor a "specified jurisdiction" court. A pure pour over 
court is one whose docket consists solely of cases sent to it by the supreme court; 
a specified jurisdiction court is one whose docket consists solely of cases that arise 
under one of its statutory heads of jurisdiction. Jackson, supra note 7, at 18. 
The initial members of the court of appeals considered their role in the judicial 
system as encompassing three central goals: elimination of the appellate backlog; 
development of case law in the area of its own original jurisdiction; and assisting 
the supreme court by focussing and narrowing the legal issues presented to it. See 
Billings, supra note 7, at  153; Jackson, supra note 7, at  19. 
11. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-2a-2(1), (2) (1994). Judges are randomly assigned 
to sit on panels for three months. Because the panels shift every three months, 
each judge has the opportunity to work on a panel with every other appellate 
judge during the year. 
12. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-2a-2(2) (1994). When creating the court of appeals, 
the legislature adopted the task force's recommendation that a hearing en banc 
was unnecessary. The task force's reasoning was as follows: 
The court of appeals should be prohibited by legislation from sitting en 
banc . . . . Such rehearings typically are used to conform inconsistent 
decisions . . . or to reverse a decision . . . that does not have the support 
of the whole court. It is the conclusion of the task force that rehearings 
en banc do not accomplish these goals. Rather, if the issue is so compli- 
cated or controversial, or the principle of law so unsettled as to generate 
inconsistent panel decisions or a sizable minority opinion, a rehearing will 
tend to further complicate the issue, not resolve it. Moreover, such a case 
will likely be appealed to the supreme court in any event. Since the su- 
preme court is available to resolve such matters, it is far better to use 
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The court's appellate jurisdiction embraces several subject 
matter categories, including: 
1. Final orders and decrees of state agencies;13 
2. Juvenile court appeals;14 
3. Circuit court appeals, except for small claims court deci- 
sions;15 
4. Criminal cases, unless the charge is a first degree or capi- 
tal felony;16 
5. Domestic relations determinations;17 
6. Utah Military Court appeals;'' and 
7. Cases "poured over'' from the supreme court.lg 
In addition, the court of appeals may certify to the supreme 
court for review any case falling within its jur isdi~t ion.~~ 
C. Treatment of Precedent 
Although the court of appeals recognized that stare decisis 
required it to follow the precedents of the supreme court:' it 
seems to have initially concluded that these same principles of 
stare decisis did not require one panel of the court to adhere to 
the precedents set by another panel. This position finds implicit 
support in the legislative decision to prohibit en banc rehear- 
that resource in the first instance and save the time and expense of a 
rehearing by the court of appeals en banc. 
Governor's Task Force on the Judicial Article, Oct. 9, 1985, at 66-67, quoted in 
State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Judge Norman Jackson used the task force's reasoning as justification for inconsis- 
tent precedents. Id. a t  831 ("I remind the reader that conflicting panel decisions 
were expected to occur and contemplated by the statute creating this court."). 
Although Thurman has removed one reason for an en banc procedure, preven- 
tion of inconsistent precedent, this Comment will show that stare decisis jurispru- 
dence allows the court of appeals to achieve the other reason for an en banc hear- 
ing, overruling precedent, without recourse to a statutory grant of authority. See 
infia part IV.B.2. 
13. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-2a-3(2)(a), (b) (1994). 
14. Id. 5 78-2a-3(2)(c). 
15. Id. 5 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
16. Id. 78-2a-3(2)(e), (f). 
17. Id. 78-2a-3(2)(i). 
18. Id. 5 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
19. Id. 5 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
20. Id. 5 78-2a-3(3). Although the supreme court has sole discretion over 
granting or denying certiorari petitions, it  may not decline to review a case certi- 
fied to it from the court of appeals. Id. 5 78-2-2(5); see also infia part IV.B.1. 
21. See, e.g., State v. Vincent, 845 P.2d 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) (pointing to supreme court decision that should govern the disposi- 
tion of the case), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
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ings. As noted above, the legislature adopted the task force's 
conclusion that the reasons for an en banc rehear- 
ing-overruling precedent and conformation of inconsistent 
decisions-would be more efficiently handled through review at 
the supreme court level than through a rehearing by the entire 
court of appeals. This reasoning allowed the court of appeals to 
conclude that inconsistency among panels was both expected 
and ~ermitted.'~ Consequently, the court determined that 
panels would not be bound by each other's precedents and that 
any inconsistencies would be resolved by supreme court review. 
Despite the logic of the court's reasoning, the supreme 
court subsequently determined that stare decisis does apply to 
the court of appeals, requiring that one panel be bound by the 
decision of another.23 In State u. Thurman, the Utah Supreme 
Court took the opportunity to voice its concern about a continu- 
ing division of authority among the panels of the court of ap- 
p e a l ~ . ~ ~  Speaking for the court, Justice Zimmerman noted the 
fundamental role stare decisis plays in Anglo-American juris- 
prudence25 and concluded that considerations of both the fun- 
damental role of stare decisis and the values it affirms requires 
that each panel of the court of appeals be bound by the deci- 
sions of the others.2B Indeed, as Justice Zimmerman ac- 
knowledged, a conclusion that stare decisis does not require 
panels t o  be bound by each others' decisions would sanction a 
legal system in which "the outcome of an appeal . . . would be 
dependent more on the composition of the panel hearing the 
case than on whether the issue has been previously addressed 
and decided . . . 
Although the Thurman decision is legally correct and salu- 
it raises as many questions as it settles.29 Specifically, 
22. The rules governing the grant of a petition for certiorari also support this 
conclusion. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure lists inconsistent 
decisions among panels on the same issue of law as a reason justifying a writ of 
certiorari. UTAH R. APP. P. 46(a)(l) (1994). Presumably this rule should be revised 
in light of the supreme court's decision in State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 
1993). 
23. Thurman, 846 P.2d at  1269. 
24. Id. (noting the split among the panels on the issue of the proper standard 
of review for questions of voluntariness of consent under the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution). 
25. Id. (noting that stare decisis was critical to the viability and predictability 
of the law, as well as  to fairness of adjudication). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. The effect of the court's decision may be gauged by comparing the num- 
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Thurman failed to address how stare decisis applied t o  an  
intermediate, multi-panel appellate court. Further, the su- 
preme court did not discuss whether, or how, a panel of the 
court of appeals could limit the impact of or overrule a prior 
decision. These issues will be addressed in the following sec- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  
A fundamental element of Anglo-American jurisprudence is 
the principle that the law should be stable, fostering both 
equality and predictability of treatment. Because so much of 
our law is judge-made common law, the system achieves this 
stability through adherence to the legal maxim "stare decisis et 
non quieta movere," or "stand by the decision and do not dis- 
turb what is settled."31 Stare decisis is a fundamental feature 
of common law jurisprudence and requires that a court adhere 
to prior decisions rendered either by itself or by a higher court 
within its system. Although stare decisis requires absolute 
adherence to decisions rendered by higher courts, it does per- 
mit greater flexibility in the treatment of prior decisions ren- 
dered by a court itself. This section first presents a discussion 
of the traditional formulation of the rule of stare decisis, in- 
cluding the public policy considerations that underlie the doc- 
trine, and the determination of what parts of the prior opinion 
ber of cases in which "stare decisis* was mentioned by a panel of the court of 
appeals and stated as the basis for its holding. In the twelve months prior to State 
u. Thurman, "stare decisis" was mentioned only once. Salt Lake Citizens Congress 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1993). During the twelve 
months following Thurman, the court relied on "stare decisis" a total of seven 
times. 
29. For example, the court's decision did not resolve the question as to what 
a panel should do when confronted with an issue on which there is more than one 
precedent that could control the issue. At least one panel has concluded that 
Thurman stands for the proposition that formerly inconsistent precedents are done 
away with and that a panel should set a new precedent, binding on the rest, when 
confronted with inconsistent precedents. See King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 
1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting that in the absence of a clear statement from 
the supreme court it would review the previous court of appeals decision and make 
its own conclusion). 
30. See infra part 1II.B for a discussion of how the application of the doctrine 
of stare decisis applies to a multi-panel court. See infra part IV for a discussion of 
how one panel may both limit and overrule prior decisions. 
31. For an alternative, yet perhaps truthful, translation of stare decisis, see 
James D. Gordon 111, Humor in h g a l  Education and Scholarship, 1992 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 313, 314 n.7 (quipping that stare decisis is Latin for "[wle stand by our past 
mistakes"). 
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are truly binding under the rule. The discussion then turns t o  a 
consideration of how the doctrine impacts the court of appeals 
in two distinct ways under the rubric of vertical and horizontal 
stare decisis. 
A. The Traditional Formulation of the Doctrine 
Stare decisis, unlike some other legal  concept^^^ is reduc- 
ible to a simple principle. When a court lays down a rule of law 
attaching a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts, 
the court must adhere to the legal principle it has announced 
by applying it in all subsequent cases that come before it pre- 
senting a similar factual premise.33 In addition, courts owing 
obehence to the court that rendered the initial decision must 
also adhere to the announced legal principle. Thus, stare deci- 
sis simply requires that courts adhere to their own decisions 
and those of a higher hierarchical court.34 Despite the concep- 
tual simplicity of stare decisis, correct application of the doc- 
trine entails collateral principles that are somewhat more com- 
plex and less settled.35 For example, under stare decisis, only 
the precedent of a former decision is binding on the court in 
subsequent cases, requiring a court or litigant t o  distinguish 
between precedent and dicta. Further, although stare decisis 
would seemingly prevent the abandonment of precedent once 
set, courts have nevertheless determined that stare decisis does 
not prohibit the overruling of a prior decision.36 
Although a complete discussion of all issues generated by 
the application of stare decisis is beyond the scope of a single 
32. For example, consider property law's unholy trinity: the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, Shelley's Rule, and the Doctrine of Worthier Title. These bedevil not 
only law students but also practitioners and courts. See, e.g., Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 
324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ct. Ch. 1787). 
33. See HENRY C. BLACK, THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, 2-3, 182 (1912); 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 978-79 (6th ed. 1991); 1B JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL. 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE '11 0.402[1], a t  4. 
34. Because stare decisis limits the ability of a court to reconsider past deci- 
sions, it bears a resemblance to other similar doctrines: law of the case, res judica- 
ta, collateral estoppel, and h l l  faith and credit. For a discussion of these doctrines 
and how they differ from stare decisis, see MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.401; see also 
Stormont-Vail Regional Medical Ctr. v. Bowen, 645 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1986). 
35. Professor Moore notes that the "doctrine of stare decisis has produced a 
vast literature* and has collected over 25 recent articles discussing the issues it  
raises. MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[1], at 4 n.1. 
36. But cf. Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., K.B. 719, 2 All E.R. 293 (1944) 
(holding that the English Court of Appeal does not have the authority to overrule 
its prior decisions). 
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article, this Comment will focus on those areas that will assist 
the court of appeals-and any court or litigator-in applying 
precedent consistent with stare decisis jurisprudence. The re- 
mainder of this section considers the policies that underlie 
adherence to prior decisions and notes the distinction between 
precedent and dicta, including a method for distinguishing 
between them. The analysis then turns to the dual impact of 
stare decisis on an intermediate court of appeals, introducing 
the concepts of vertical and horizontal stare decisis. 
1. Public policies served by stare decisis 
Although the practice of adhering to one's prior decisions 
has been attributed to other, less policy-oriented reasons,37 
there are several important policies underlying the rule that 
precedents should be adhered to and not lightly o~erruled.~' 
Although these policy considerations have been phrased in a 
number of ways, they may be classified into three general cate- 
gories: (i) reliance and stability interests; (ii) judicial expedition 
and economy; and (iii) the "image of justice." 
First, judicial reticence to stray from prior decisions pro- 
motes a continuity and cohesion in the law that protects indi- 
viduals who have ordered their conduct in accordance with and 
in reliance on current interpretations of the law.3g Adherence 
to precedent is at a premium in those areas of law that impact 
the stability of such social institutions as the family, the gov- 
ernment, and the economyPO Moreover, courts applying prior 
decisions in subsequent cases protect litigants from "untoward 
37. Thus, Professor Currier notes that the doctrine may be attributable to 
"habit, tradition, historical accident, and sheer intellectual inertia." Thomas S. 
Currier, Time and Change in Judge-made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. 
REV. 201, 235 (1965) (citing BENJAMIN . CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 21-22 (1921)). 
38. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993); see also BLACK, supra note 33, at 184- 
86 (collecting cases); Currier, supra note 37, at 235-38; Lewis F. Powell, Stare 
Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. S. CT. HISTORY 13, 15-16. 
39. The importance of stability is such that Justice Brandeis suggested that, 
with certain exceptions, it is more important to settle an issue than to settle it 
correctly. See Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 
U.S. 376, 387 (1938). 
40. See Currier, supra note 37, at 235-38; Powell, supra note 38, at 16. 
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surprise" and encourage the settlement of disputes without 
resort to courts of law.41 
Second, judicial economy and expedition are served by this 
doctrine. Neither courts nor litigants are required to revisit all 
relevant issues presented in a case. As Justice Cardozo, in 
characteristically pithy phrasing, explained, "the labor of judg- 
es would be increased almost to the breaking point if every 
past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could 
not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of 
the courses laid by others who had gone before him.'"2 In- 
stead, only original propositions of fact and law need to be 
litigated and decided without reference to precedent. As Justic- 
es O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter noted: "[No] judicial system 
could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case 
that raised it."43 
Lastly, adherence t o  precedent sustains the belief that 
courts should not only administer justice, but should also be 
Stare decisis also promotes an equality of treatment for 
all persons who are similarly situated. The fundamental value 
of equal treatment, requiring that persons in like circumstanc- 
es be treated alike unless some relevant factor distinguishes 
their cases, is central t o  traditional notions of Anglo-American 
justice.45 
In sum, the practice of adhering to prior decisions serves to  
protect individual interests as well as to promote efficient and 
just adjudication. These considerations of public policy not only 
support the doctrine of stare decisis but must also function as 
countervailing factors when a court decides whether t o  depart 
from prior  decision^.^^ 
2. Precedent and dicta 
Although stare decisis requires that courts adhere to their 
former decisions, it does not demand that every element of an 
opinion be followed as binding authority. Rather, only the 
41. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403. 
42. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 
(192 1). 
43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (opinion of 
O'Connor, K e ~ e d y ,  Souter, JJ.) (citing BENJAMIN . CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
TKE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)). 
44. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). 
45. Id. 
46. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403. See infra part IV.B.2. 
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precedential rule of law is binding authority in subsequent 
cases.47 Thus, all the parts of the opinion not constituting the 
precedent are non-binding in subsequent cases? The task, 
then, is to distinguish the rule of law from the other parts of 
the opinion. Although what constitutes the "precedent" is the 
object of great debate:' this section will attempt to define the 
concept and suggest a method of finding the precedent and 
dicta in an opinion.50 
Orthodox American jurisprudence interprets stare decisis 
as "keeping t o  the former decisions" (stare decisis) and not as 
"keeping t o  the reasoning of former decisions" (stare rationibus 
decidendi~),~' nor as "keeping t o  the dicta of former decisions" 
(stare d i ~ t i s ) . ~ ~  A court reaches a decision when it attaches a 
specific legal consequence to  a definite, detailed set of facts. 
Thus, the reasoning of the court, as well as its hypothetical 
47. For an exception to this general rule, see infizl part III.B.l. 
48. Courts and commentators generally acknowledge that not all parts of an 
opinion are binding in subsequent cases. Traditionally, the distinction is between 
the precedent, which must be followed, and "dicta," which are not binding. See 
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (noting that "no court is required to follow another court's dicta"); Shep- 
herd Fleets v. Opryland USA, 759 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating 
that "obiter dictum is not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis"); Lester v. 
First American Bank, 866 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that 
"'[dJictum' . . . will not create binding precedent under stare decisis"); see also 
BLACK, supra note 33, at 174-77 (noting that although dicta "of all kinds" may be 
entitled to respect, they do not possess the weight of precedent in either the court 
that spoke it or any other). See generally Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 
509 (1952) (discussing role of dictum in legal analysis). 
Various reasons exist for not affording dicta the effect of precedent. Because 
the statement of dicta is unnecessary to the decision, it is argued that the state- 
ment is not as fully considered. Further, dicta on issues not argued or briefed are 
not exposed to the adversarial process, designed to bring out truth. More funda- 
mentally, most dicta are presumed to be an expression of the author of the opin- 
ion, rather than a reasoned consensus of the court. 
I shall label as "dicta" all parts of an opinion that are not the precedential 
rule of law. Thus, dicta would include the court's reasoning, hypothetical situations, 
and discussions unrelated to the ultimate conclusion. 
49. Moore notes that "[wlhat constitutes the [binding part of an opinion] has 
produced considerable intellectual ferment." MOORE, supra note 33, qI 0.402[2], at  
26 & n.9. 
50. Judge Aldisert notes that, in addition to being a misunderstood subject, 
precedent may be more easily understood than explained. Ruggero J. Aldisert, 
Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill 
It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 606 (1990). After my attempt here, I am quite inclined 
to  agree. 
51. See RUPERT CROSS, Different Meanings of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT IN 
ENGLISH LAW, 104-05 (2d ed. 1968). 
52. Aldisert, supra note 50, at 607. 
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statements, are mere dicta and do not constitute binding au- 
thority in subsequent  situation^.^^ Consequently, the prece- 
dent of a case resides in the rule of law emerging from the 
court's decision: a specific legal consequence attaching to a 
detailed set of facts.54 
Because the precedent of a case is contained in its decision, 
the precedential rule of law may be determined by parsing the 
opinion for the consequences attaching to a set of relevant 
facts.55 One method of examining the opinion is to allocate the 
parts of the opinion into the classic syllogistic framework used 
in deductive logic: major premise, minor premise, and conclu- 
sion? 
Within the framework of an opinion, these categories 
would contain the following elements of the opinion: 
Major premise: the reasoning of the court, or the initial rea- 
soning principle from which the analysis is launched. 
Minor premise: the material facts of the case, as the court 
sees them, and as drawn from the court record.57 
Conclusion: the specific result reached by drawing a conclu- 
sion from the major and minor premises. 
Precedent: the rule of law that emerges from examining the 
specific legal consequence (i.e., the conclusion) attaching to a 
detailed set of facts (i.e., the minor premise). 
53. "We know this because a decision may still be vital although the original 
reasons for supporting it may have changed drastically or been proved terribly 
fallacious." Aldisert, supra note 50, at 607; see also Arthur L. Goodhart, Determin- 
ing thP Ratio Decidndi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 162-64 (1930). Thus, cases 
retain their vitality for stare decisis purposes even though their underlying reason- 
ing may have been undercut by subsequent events. 
54. Aldisert, supra note 50, at 606; Goodhart, supra note 53, at 182-83 
55. "The principle of the case is found by taking account (a) of the fads 
treated by the judge as material, and 03) his decision as based on them." Goodhart, 
supra note 53, at  182. 
56. Cf. Aldisert, supra note 50, a t  612. To give conte~t  to these categories, I 
offer the traditional deductive syllogism: 
Major premise: All men are mortal. 
Minor premise: Socrates is a man. 
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
57. For a multi-prong test for determining what facts are material see 
Goodhart, supra note 53, at 182-83. 
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Analysis of a hypothetical case will help clarify this discus- 
sion. In this hypothetical case, the court has determined that a 
driver who drove on surface streets in excess of eighty miles 
per hour was liable for negligence when his car swerved across 
the center divider and struck a grandmother walking her Ger- 
man shepherd dog, Br~nhilde.~' A parse of the opinion would 
be as follows: 
Major premise: Driving at  excessive speeds is negligent. 
Minor premise: The driver was traveling a t  more than eighty 
miles per hour on a surface street. 
Conclusion: The driver is negligent because he was traveling 
a t  excessive speeds and is therefore liable to the grandmother 
and her German shepherd dog. 
Precedent: Driving a t  eighty miles per hour or more on a sur- 
face street is negligent, rendering the drives liable. 
The court will be required to  adhere t o  this precedent 
when subsequent cases arise presenting a similar factual prem- 
ise. 
Once it is determined that the case is only an authoritative 
precedent for its rule of law-a legal precept emerging from the 
specific legal consequences attaching to a detailed set of 
facts-then dicta, the traditional bane of precedential analy- 
sis? are more easily distinguished and avoided?' Dicta are 
what remains after the precedent is extracted. 
58. Although the car was totaled, both victims escaped with minor injuries 
but suffered severe emotional distress, necessitating frequent trips to Carmel, Cali- 
fornia (shortbread for Brunhilde) and shopping sprees at Laura Ashley in Canter- 
bury, England (emotional healing for grandmother). 
This hypothetical is dedicated to Ms. Heidi K. Hubbard who introduced me to 
both tort law and creative hypotheticals. 
59. "Obiter dictum is where the precedential dragon often reposes." Aldisert, 
supra note 50, at  612. "Dictum is one of the commonest yet least discussed of legal 
concepts. Every lawyer thinks he knows what it means, yet few lawyers think 
much more about it. Non thinking and overuse combine to make for fuzziness." 
Note, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L. REV. 509, 509 (1952). 
60. However, the ability to distinguish dicta from precedent may not be at  a 
premium. One argument states that the ability to label something as dicta confers 
the right-and correctly so under modern stare decisis jurisprudence-to disregard 
the statement in subsequent cases; thus, the ability to label a statement as "mere 
dicta" enables a court to avoid a prior decision. See Note, Dictum Revisited, supra 
note 48; see also infra part 1V.A. 
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Under the syllogistic framework above, the precedent is the 
legal precept drawn from a consideration of the minor premise 
and the conclusion of the court. Thus, dicta would include any 
statements that do not appear in either the minor premise or 
the concl~sion.~~ 
A return to the hypothetical case previously discussed6' 
will clarify this discussion. In an opinion of the hypothetical 
negligence case, any of the following would be properly classi- 
fied as dicta: 
1. A comment that the driver might not be liable if the 
steering wheel had broken off.63 
2. A suggestion that the driver would be liable for punitive 
damages if he were driving without prescription glasses.64 
3. A discussion of a possible defense to negligence liability if 
the driver had been rushing his elder sister, Vivian, to the 
hospital after she had been thrown by a galloping horse.65 
A court, then, is not bound to follow the dicta of a prior 
decision, but only the specific consequences that attach to a 
detailed set of facts. In  other words, "a case is important only 
for what it decides: for 'the what,' not for 'the why' and not for 
'the how.' 'm 
61. Accordingly, in more traditional terms, dicta would comprise the reasoning 
of the court, statements of fact that do not appear in court record, and any state- 
ment that relates to situations not contained in the actual facts giving rise to the 
litigation. See BLACK, supra note 33, at 174 (dicta are anything that are "not with- 
in the limits of official decision nor made in the exercise of judicial functionsn); 
Aldisert, supra note 50, at  612 (concluding that dicta are either a description of 
facts not contained in the case record or the statement of facts not contained in 
the minor premise); Goodhart, supra note 53, at  183 (dictum is conclusion premised 
on hypothetical facts). 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
63. This statement represents a description of a factual scenario contained in 
neither the minor premise nor the conclusion. 
64. In addition to the reason given in the above note, this statement also 
represents an additional Line of reasoning; because the reasoning of the court falls 
under the major premise, it is not part of the court's decision. 
65. The reasoning of the court is not part of the court's decision for purposes 
of stare decisis. 
66. Aldisert, supra note 50, at 607. 
THE STRAITS OF STARE DECISIS 
B. Stare Decisis' Dual Impact on a Multi-Panel Appellate 
Court: Vertical and Horizontal Stare Decisis 
The principle of stare decisis may be divided into two com- 
plementary concepts. Such a division aids in understanding the 
impact of stare decisis, especially its effect on an intermediate, 
multi-panel appellate court such as the court of appeald7 
Analysis will begin first with vertical stare decisis, involving 
courts of different rank within a common judicial system, and 
then proceed with a discussion of horizontal stare decisis, in- 
volving a single court or one court composed of several indepen- 
dent benches. 
1. Vertical stare decisis 
Vertical stare decisis requires that courts adhere to prece- 
dents set by courts of higher hierarchical rank within the same 
judicial system.68 Moreover, lower courts must strictly follow 
the decisions of superior courts, regardless of whether they 
agree with the other court's analysis or conclu~ion.~~ Black 
summarizes the requirements imposed by vertical stare decisis: 
Inferior courts are absolutely bound to follow the decisions of 
the courts having appellate . . . jurisdiction over them. In this 
aspect, precedents set by the higher courts are imperative in 
the strictest sense. They are conclusive on the lower courts, 
67. Note, however, that isolated consideration of the principle of horizontal 
stare decisis would be helpful for understanding the impact of stare decisis on a 
multi-panel court regardless of its hierarchical rank. 
68. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993); Barstow v. State, 
742 S.W.2d 495, 501 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Judge Aldisert points out the con- 
trast between the common law and civil law traditions in the area of adherence to 
precedent. Whereas the common law tradition affords great respect to the prece- 
dent, civil law tradition theoretically requires that each court conduct an ab initio 
interpretation of the legislative mandate in question. Aldisert, supra note 50, a t  
608; see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental &gal Systems, 43 
U. Pin‘. L. REV. 935 (1982). 
69. See J d r e e  v. Board of School Comm'r, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316 (1983); In re 
Marriage of Thorlin, 746 P.2d 929, 834 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a lower 
court may not disregard a clear precedent merely because it disagrees with sup- 
porting analysis). Compare Thorlin with Aldisert, supra note 50, at 607 and 
Goodhart, supra note 53, at 162-64 (both authors noting that a precedent may 
maintain vitality despite fallacious reasoning). 
Jafiee presents a vivid example of this principle. In reversing a district court's 
preliminary injunction against a prohibition on school prayers, the Supreme Court, 
with Justice Powell speaking as Circuit Justice, stated that a district court must 
follow established precedent until the Court reverses it, even if the district court 
thinks that the Supreme Court erred. Jaffie, 459 U.S. at  1315. 
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and leave to the latter no scope for independent judgment or  
di~cretion.~' 
Although the policy considerations underlying stare decisis 
as a whole support this practice, two additional policies justify 
this requirement of strict adherence. First, failure to follow the 
precedents set by courts possessing jurisdiction to review such 
decisions would produce continual appeals. Second, strict ad- 
herence to precedent preserves a superior court's role as final 
arbiter of the law. 
Vertical stare decisis' requirement of strict adherence has  
been interpreted as a n  exception to the general rule that  courts 
must only follow the decision of an opinion rather than its 
dicta. According to traditional analysis, vertical stare decisis 
compels a lower court to follow both the precedent and dicta 
contained in a higher court's opinion.71 
This anomaly is justified by the role that  such dicta fre- 
quently play.72 Often these extra-precedential statements 
serve as authoritative notice of how the court will respond to 
an issue when it is fully presented to the court. Further, the 
court may use such dicta to announce rules of conduct for mem- 
bers of the bar or lower Lastly, a court may render a 
decision in a case, remanding it to a lower court with procedur- 
al directions. These directions, although technically dicta, are 
binding on the lower court. Because these statements operate 
as a guide for future conduct, they serve the overarching stare 
decisis policy of promoting stability and reliance under the law. 
2. Horizontal stare decisis 
While vertical stare decisis requires a lower court to ad- 
here to a higher court's precedents, horizontal stare decisis 
70. BLACK, supra note 33, at 10. 
71. See Lewis v. Sava, 602 F. Supp. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that, 
in the absence of any authority to the contrary, the court was bound by dicta in 
Supreme Court opinion); Kutschinski v. Thompson, 138 A. 569, 575 (N.J. Ch. 1927) 
(noting that dictum of a court of last resort is binding in the absence of contrary 
authority). But cf. La Guire v. Kain, 460 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that court of appeals is free to decline to follow supreme court dicta). 
Frequently, such dicta are known as "judicial dicta." 
72. See Fogerty v. State, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810, 815 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1986); 
Ex parte Harrison, 741 S.W.2d 607, 608-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). See generally 
ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: R FORMING PRIVATE LAW (1969). 
73. Cf.  State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (statement on 
stare decisis is binding on lower courts although technically dictum). 
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requires a court to  follow its own prior decisions. This doctrine 
applies with equal force to courts comprising one bench or 
several independent panels, requiring each panel to observe the 
decisions of another.74 The scope of this principle, however, 
extends only t o  panels of a unitary court and not to panels of 
different, yet co-equal, courts. Thus, district courts, whether 
state or federal, are usually not bound by the decision rendered 
by another district court.75 
Departure from the principle of horizontal stare decisis 
would frustrate the policies underlying stare decisis as a whole: 
the promotion of reliance and stability under the law; judicial 
economy and expedition of litigation; and an image of a just 
and legitimate legal system rendering equal treatment to all. 
Moreover, adoption of any other rule would produce a result 
contrary to notions of fair play and substantial justice inherent 
in the Anglo-American common law tradition.76 
Although horizontal stare decisis, then, requires that pan- 
els follow a precedent set by another panel, it does not require 
that a panel adhere t o  its own or another panel's prior deci- 
sions with the same level of absolute inflexibility imposed by 
74. See id.; Opsal v. United Servs. Auto A s h ,  283 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Crowley, 605 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992); Commonwealth v. Burns, 395 S.E.2d 456, 457 (Va. 1990). 
This principle is applied among the panels of the federal circuit courts of ap- 
peal in which "the decision of a panel is a decision of the court and carries the 
weight of stare decisis . . . govern[ing] subsequent cases . . . before the same or a 
different panel of the court of appeals." MOORE, supra note 33, qI 0.402[1], a t  18. 
Because one panel is bound by the decisions of another, the question of which 
decision will be precedent may present a close call when more than one panel has 
rendered a conflicting decision on the same day. See id. a t  18 11.30. When this oc- 
curs, resolution of the conflicting decisions may occur either by Supreme Court 
affirmance of one decision, or by holding a rehearing en banc, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
8 46(c) (1988); or by consolidation of the cases prior to rendering a final judgment, 
e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 3(b). 
75. See, e.g., Williams v. AGK Communications, 542 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1989) (courts of co-equal authority are not bound to follow one another); see 
also MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[1], a t  20. 
76. As Justice Zimrnerman pointed out: 
If stare decisis had no application to a multi-panel court . . . it would 
sanction a judicial system under which the outcome of an appeal present- 
ing a particular legal question would be dependent more on the composi- 
tion of the panel hearing the case than on whether the issue has been 
previously addressed and decided by that court. I t  is one thing to admit 
that differences among judges on a particular legal question can exist; i t  
is quite another to sanction variability in the rule of law depending solely 
on which of several judges of an appellate court sit on a given case. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d a t  1269. 
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vertical stare decisis. As a result, although each panel is gener- 
ally bound by prior decisions of other panels, a panel may be 
able to adhere to or modify other panels' decisions while com- 
plying with the doctrinal demands of stare decisis. The theory 
that panels may find 'leeways" around the decisions of another 
panel is discussed in the following section. 
IV. THE LEEWAYS OF STARE DECISIS: AVOIDING THE STRAIT- 
JACKETOFPRECEDENT 
Although weighty considerations of public policy underlie 
the judicial principle of adherence to precedent, public policy 
also requires that the law develop in accordance with modern 
notions of justice, equality, and fairness. As the plurality opin- 
ion in  Planned Parenthood v. Casey acknowledged, "[tlhe ob- 
ligation to  follow precedent begins with necessity, and a con- 
trary necessity marks its outer limit."77 Necessity reaches this 
outer limit when the policy considerations undergirding adher- 
ence either weigh in favor of, or are not implicated by, the 
limiting or overruling of precedent. Reliance interests are least 
impacted when an old rule is replaced by one that  comports 
with current modes of beha~ior. '~ Nor is judicial expedition 
threatened by a new rule that enhances judicial efficien~y.~~ 
Moreover, both the image of judicial legitimacy and the ethic of 
equal treatment are less affected by adoption of a rule that 
promotes equality of treatment than they are by adherence to a 
rule that is unprincipled in its reasoning and app l i ca t i~n .~~  In 
order to afford justice for the parties coming before it, a court 
must stand ready to limit and overrule its own precedents? 
Traditional stare decisis jurisprudence permits a court to 
both limit and overrule prior decisions? This section provides 
77. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (opinion of O'Comor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.). 
78. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). 
79. See id. at 405. 
80. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) 
(adopting the principle of implied warranty of habitability in Utah). 
81. Returning to the conceit adopted in the title and introduction of this ar- 
ticle, a prudent court must avoid both the Scylla of hasty displacement of prece- 
dent as well as the Charybdis of senseless perpetuation of an unprincipled and 
unnecessary precedent. See Traynor, supra note 1, at 263. 
82. Note, however, a court may only legitimately limit or overrule its own 
precedents. Compare part III.B.l (vertical stare decisis) with part III.B.2 (horizontal 
stare decisis). 
6331 THE STRAITS OF STARE DECISIS 651 
an overview of how a court, such as the Utah Court of Appeals, 
may avoid the pitfall of over-application of pre~edent.'~ 
A. Indirect Leeways (No Overruling of Precedent) 
Orthodox American stare decisis jurisprudence provides 
limits on the application of prior decisions, suggesting the pos- 
sible narrowing of a prior decision when a subsequent case f d s  
within its apparent scope; yet, the decision's effect is sought to 
be avoided." Application of these techniques will permit a 
court to evade the scope of a prior precedent without extin- 
guishing the prior decision. Although the precedent has sur- 
vived and may subsequently reappearYs5 a shift away from the 
direct impact of the precedent has occurred. This shift not only 
allows the court to avoid the precedent, but also encourages the 
growth of the law in a new dire~tion.'~ 
1.  Narrow construction 
Stare decisis jurisprudence principally limits the applica- 
tion of a former decision by narrowly construing what aspect of 
a prior case is binding authority in a subsequent case. Unlike 
83. Thus, this section charts the way around the second sea-monster of stare 
decisis, the Charybdis of Over-Application. 
A court's ability to overrule or limit the application of a precedent frequently 
depends on the vitality, or "bite," of the prior decision. See Aldisert, supra note 50, 
at 613 (noting that not all precedents have the same "bite"). Factors affecting the 
vitality of a precedent include: (i) whether the decision is contained in a well-writ- 
ten opinion; (ii) whether the precedent is  itself based on clear precedent; (iii) 
whether the precedent represents a single isolated case rather than a decision that 
has been followed in several subsequent cases, affirming its socio-judicial utility 
and desirability; and (iv) whether the decision is weakened by either a trenchant 
dissent or a concurring opinion that casts doubts on the majority's decision. See 
BLACK, supra note 33, at 90-91; EDWARD . RE, STARE DECISIS 10 (1975). 
84. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, The Leeways of Precedent, in THE COMMON 
LAW TF~ADITION 62-92 (1960). As Llewelyn puts it, each of these various techniques 
speaks thus to a court: 
As you search for the right rule of law to govern the case in hand, I am 
one of the things which, respectably, honorably, and in full accordance 
with the common law tradition . . . you are formally entitled in and by 
your office to do to and with any prior relevant judicial language or hold- 
ing as it comes before you. 
Id. at 76. 
85. Cf. the hockey-masked ghoul in the endless Friday the 13th series of 
films. 
86. See Aldisert, supra note 50, at  608-12 (suggesting that the correct use of 
precedent follows the "common-law tradition of incremental and gradual accretion 
of an original narrow rule"). See generally Traynor, supra note 1. 
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vertical stare decisis,s7 horizontal stare decisis does not re- 
quire that one follow the dicta (broadly defined to in- 
clude the reasoning) in a prior decision?' consequently, a 
panel is bound to follow only the decision of another panel: the 
legal principle that emerges from the specific consequences 
attaching to a detailed set of facts. 
2. "The rule (or principle) was there recognized, the only difi-  
culty being in its application. 
A court may avoid a precedent by pointing out that, al- 
though the past decision is fundamentally correct, it has been 
incorrectly applied in subsequent cases. The court may then 
purport to apply correctly the "true" rule of law in the present 
case at bmgl 
3. "Each case of this kind must be dealt with on its own 
facts." '" 
A court may also avoid precedent by stating that either the 
precedent or the present case must be dealt with, or confined 
to, its own facts.93 
87. See supra part III.B.l. 
88. Although the discussion in this section is focused primarily on a multi- 
panel court, the discussion is equally applicable to a single bench appellate court. 
89. See supra part III.B.2. 
90. LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 84. The techniques and titles of this and 
the following two methods are adopted from Llewellyn's work, which presents more 
than sixty methods of limiting the application of precedent. 
91. Id. For recent Supreme Court decisions following this technique see 
P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (claiming to adhere to the 
"core" of Roe u. Wade while simultaneously abandoning or re-interpreting parts of 
the prior decision); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (abandoning the 
Aguilar-Spinelli test and recognizing a totality of the circumstances test that "is 
far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause"); see also 
McPhearson v. Buick, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
92. LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 84. 
93. Id. Thus, in Town of Farmington v. Miller, 328 P.2d 589 (N.M. 1958), the 
supreme court of New Mexico determined that an occupational tax should not be 
imposed on an itinerant salesperson who sold products that would be shipped later 
from out-of-state, reasoning that the "practical considerations, which presumably 
motivated the Robbins decision and those which followed in its wake, are in large 
measure absent in this case. And the particular facts of each case must control the 
decision." Id. at 591. 
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4. "Kill off as dictum, as such and without more."94 
In addition, a court may decline to follow a holding in a 
prior case by declaring it t o  be dicta.g5 Although this lacks the 
intellectual integrity of other methods, it is as well established 
in stare decisis tradition as the other methods.96 
An example of this technique is found in Hans u. Louisi- 
ana, in which the United States Supreme Court expanded the 
scope of state immunity from suits in federal courts as 
grounded in the Eleventh Arnend~nent.~' After determining 
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited federal question suits 
against a state in federal court, the Court acknowledged that 
this position was undercut by Chief Justice Marshall's observa- 
tion in Cohens v. Virginia that the amendment did not prohibit 
federal question suits. Responding to  this dilemma, the Court 
stated: "[Tlhe observation was unnecessary to the decision, and 
in that sense extra judicial, and though made by one who sel- 
dom used words without due reflection, ought not to outweigh 
the important considerations referred to which lead to  a differ- 
ent conclusion.~'98 
Sic semper dictis. 
Thus, a variety of techniques abound which allow the court 
to limit the application of precedent without expressly needing 
to overrule it. However, in some circumstances, the proper 
technique or the only technique may be overruling. 
B. Direct Leeways (Ouerruling Precedent) 
Although stare decisis requires a court to adhere to its 
prior decisions, the command neither is inexorable, nor does it 
operate as a dead hand on the law.'"tare decisis permits a 
court to overrule its own decisions when the court determines 
that the former decision was erroneous.100 Although a court 
94. LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 86. 
95. Id. 
96. See, e.g., Note, Dictum Revisited, supra note 48, at 509 (theorizing that 
the slippery definition of what dictum is allows courts to disregard any prior deci- 
sion by labeling the "holding" as "dicta"). This technique may be less important 
today, if the narrow view of what constitutes a precedent is followed. See supra 
part III.A.2. 
97. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
98. Id. at 19-20. 
99. P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992). 
100. See BLACK, supra note 33, at 199-200. 
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possesses the ability to overrule precedent, the exercise thereof 
must be in a principled manner.''' 
When a panel of the court of appeals determines that a 
prior decision should be extinguished because i t  is erroneous, 
two traditional and principled methods are available.lo2 The 
first, review by the Utah Supreme Court, is fully authorized 
and available within current jurisprudence. The second, panel 
overrule, is only available in theory. Although the Utah Su- 
preme Court has not yet addressed this issue, other jurisdic- 
tions permit one appellate division to overturn another.lo3 
I .  Supreme court review 
When seeking to limit a prior decision that i t  cannot other- 
wise evade or overrule, a panel of the court of appeals may 
seek to have the decision reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
This result may be achieved in either of two ways: use of the 
statutory certification procedure or arguing for review through 
subtle use of an opinion itself. 
Section 78-2a-3(3) of the Utah Code provides the court of 
appeals with a direct method of seeking supreme court review: 
"The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the 
vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court . . . any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdi~tion."'~~ 
101. Cfi Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Ezrcise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1396 (1953) ("But 
the judges who sit for the time being on the court have no authority to remake by 
fiat alone the fabric of principle by which future cases are to be decided. They are 
only the custodians of the law and not the owners of it."). 
102. A third possible means of overruling precedent is, of course, through an 
en banc rehearing. See Commonwealth v. Crowley, 605 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (stare decisis requires adherence until decision overturned by state su- 
preme court or an en banc panel); Commonwealth v. Burns, 395 S.E.2d 456, 457 
(Va. 1990) (en banc proceeding is the means used to overturn a prior erroneous 
decision); see also MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[1], at 18-19. Utah state law, 
however, does not permit the court of appeals to sit en banc, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-2(2) (1994), and this third method is therefore not available in Utah. 
103. See Opsal v. United Sews. Auto Ass'n, 283 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1991); Denver Fire Reporter & Protection Co. v. Dutton, 736 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
Whether the court of appeals should be able to overturn clearly erroneous deci- 
sions of other panels is an open question although it could be argued that legisla- 
tive refusal to grant en banc authority, together with the traditional requirements 
of stare decisis, may have been intended to bar a panel's overruling. 
104. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(3) (1994). Further, the supreme court may not 
decline to review a certified case. Id. § 78-2-2(5). 
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Despite its availability, certification of a case to the su- 
preme court poses several problems, which may explain its lack 
of use.lo5 First, the certification process is a slow and ineffi- 
cient means of overruling precedent.lo6 Second, certification 
frustrates a primary reason for the court of appeals' existence: 
lessening the supreme court docket and concomitant backlog. 
Third, certification requires that four judges of the court-a 
majority-be willing to vote for certifi~ation. '~~ 
On the other hand, a panel may seek to limit a prior deci- 
sion by promoting review in the supreme court. A panel encour- 
ages and enhances the value of an eventual review when it 
reaches the result required by rote application of precedent, yet 
cogently outlines the logical errors in the past decisions. A 
strong, insightful opinion outlining errors in  prior decisions 
encourages a losing party to seek such review by the supreme 
court. An example of this method occurred in Carter v. United 
States.lo8 After stating briefly in one paragraph the outcome 
required by precedent, the panel continued the opinion for 
several more paragraphs, outlining a valid argument as  to why 
that precedent should be overruled. Although indirect, this 
method does have benefits. For example, it allows a judge to 
remain intellectually honest both to the principle of stare deci- 
sis, which requires her to adhere to a decision that cannot 
otherwise be limited, and to her own view of the law. Further, 
a successive series of opinions that follow, yet argue against, a 
prior decision provide a well-developed record for the supreme 
105. Section 78-2a-3(3) of the Utah Code has only been used once. See 
Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1991). Of course, a request for certifica- 
tion may have arisen in the past, yet failed to get the requisite four votes. 
106. Under this method, the court would need to await a case that was cov- 
ered by the former precedent. The court would then need to find four judges who 
would be willing to vote for certification. Further, the method would be unduly 
burdensome for the litigants, requiring that they conceivably file two sets of briefs: 
one at the court of appeals level and a second when the case was transferred to 
the supreme court. 
107. Because the reason for certification is to obtain supreme court review of 
an issue, rather than to find out whether a majority of the court is implicitly in 
favor of reversing (or upholding) a decision, certification should only require a 
minority vote of three judges. Such a practice would compare favorably with the 
certiorari process of the United States Supreme Court, which permits a minority 
vote of four (the "rule of four") to determine what cases it will hear. Under this 
system, a minority could seek review of a precedent, leaving the supreme court 
free to reverse or affirm-even summarily. 
108. 168 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1948). 
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court to review and consider when the question is finally pre- 
sented to them. loS 
Although both of these methods suffer from inefficiencies 
and frustrate attempts by the court of appeals to fulfill its role 
of diminishing the supreme court docket, they do provide two 
methods by which one panel may treat prior decisions which 
should be overruled. ' lo 
2. Panel overrule 
When it is convinced that a prior decision is out of keeping 
with the current trend of the law and that the policies underly- 
ing stare decisis would not be offended, a panel of the court of 
appeals has a panoply of techniques at  its disposal to limit, 
evade, or overrule a prior decision. As discussed above, the 
panel may indirectly limit the prior decision o r  it may directly 
attack the decision by seeking t o  extinguish it. Because these 
methods are frequently inefficient and tend to increase the 
supreme court docket, a panel should have the authority to 
overrule the court of appeals' prior decisions. 
Exercise of this power is permissible because a court may 
overturn its own decisions under traditional stare decisis analy- 
sis."' Historically, the power of a court to overrule its own 
precedents was linked to principles of natural law. Under these 
principles, a judge did not "make law" when adjudicating; rath- 
er, he applied the law as he "found" or "discovered" it. Conse- 
quently, when a judge discovered principles of law that were 
inconsistent with prior decisions, the former decisions were 
discarded as being incompatible with the true nature of the 
law. Currently, more pragmatic reasons underlie the conclusion 
that a court must be able to overrule its prior decisions. One 
fundamental reason is the recognition that a court must be 
109. The benefit of this method was noted by the United States Supreme 
Court: "[Alny ultimate review of the question that we might undertake will gain 
the benefit of a well developed record and a reasoned opinion on the merits." 
Bankers Life & Casualty v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 80 (1988). 
110. Both the inefficiency of these two methods--especially the latter-and the 
concomitant burden they necessarily impose on the supreme court docket counsel 
against their use and in favor of the court of appeals' ability to overrule its own 
decisions. See infra part IV.B.2. 
111. See BLACK, supra note 33, at 199; MOORE, supra, note 33, 0.402[1], at 9 
("[Plower exists in the court that decides a case to overrule it . . . ."); see also 
United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 448 (5th Cir. 1968) ("Our law is neither 
moribund nor muscle-bound. There are justifiable escapes and liberations from the 
rigidities and inflexibilities of stare decisis."). 
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able to overrule a prior decision when necessary t o  vindicate 
the rights of parties before it. 
Although Utah law has not yet addressed this issue, other 
jurisdictions permit one appellate panel to overrule the deci- 
sions of another when manifest injustice or compelling reasons 
counsel against adherence to precedent."' Adoption of this 
theoretic position would permit a multi-panel court which func- 
tions as a single court t o  treat prior decisions in the same man- 
ner that a single-bench court treats its prior  decision^."^ 
Consequently, adoption of this position would permit the panels 
of the court of appeals to avoid unjust decisions resulting from 
the application of erroneous precedents, without awaiting su- 
preme court review.l14 
Nevertheless, considerations of public policy, orderly ad- 
ministration, and continuity in the law dictate that decisions 
not be overruled except as justice requires and as prior deci- 
sions cannot otherwise be circumscribed. Merely to concede 
such authority is not to permit its unbridled exercise.ll5 
Rather, the court must exercise principled discretion when 
deciding whether or not to overrule a prior decision. This exer- 
cise of principled discretion should be informed first by a con- 
sideration of factors indicating whether a precedent is really 
ripe for overruling and secondly by a consideration of the possi- 
ble impact on the policies underlying the practice of adhering 
to precedent. 
112. See supra note 102. 
113. Cf BLACK, supra note 33, a t  10-11. Because panels of the court of ap- 
peals are considered as  one court for the purposes of creating precedent under 
stare decisis, they should be treated as  one court for purposes of overruling prece- 
dent. 
114. Adoption of this position would produce several benefits for the legal 
community: (i) diminishment of appellate delay and backlog; (ii) reduction of adju- 
dicator~ inefficiencies; (iii) intellectual integrity; and (iv) development of the com- 
mon law at a pace in keeping with societal needs and developments. 
115. As the Court noted in Casey, "[tlo overrule prior law for no other reason 
than [for a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently than an earlier 
court] would run counter to the view that a decision to overrule should rest on 
some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decid- 
ed." P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S .  Ct. 2791, 2813-14 (1992). Cf. BLACK, 
supra note 33, at 203-04 (listing reasons for and against overruling a prior deci- 
sion). 
Instead of overruling, prudential circumscription may be available in some 
instances. For example, a prior decision may be legitimately limited under one of 
the techniques previously discussed. See, e.g., supra part 1V.A. 
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First, then, the court should determine whether the prior 
decision is ripe for overruling. In making this determination, a 
court should consider the following factors: 
1. C~ntemporaneity:"~ The court should consider the ex- 
tent to which the prior decision is in keeping with or contrary 
to contemporary notions of justice and equity.'17 
2. Reliance:'18 The court should consider to what extent 
the public has relied on the precedent, such that its overrul- 
ing would upset the settled expectations of ~ociety."~ 
3. Doctrinal based2' This factor requires the court to de- 
termine the extent to which the development of the law since 
the rendering of the precedent has left the precedent a doc- 
trinal anachronism. 12' 
4. Practi~ality: '~~ When considering this factor, the court 
should examine the precedent in a pragmatic light, question- 
ing whether the rule it embodies has proved to be inconve- 
nient or simply unworkable in real-world application.'23 
116. Cf. MOORE, supra note 33, 91 0.402[3.-11, at 50. 
117. Thus, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court determined 
that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" required that all exer- 
cises of state court jurisdiction be judged according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and its progeny. Id. at  212. 
Similarly, contemporary notions of equal protection informed the Court's deci- 
sion to abandon the "separate but equal" doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
118. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09; MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[3.-11, at  
50. 
119. Noting that "for two decades of economic and social developments, people 
have organized intimate relationships . . . in reliance on the availability of abor- 
tion," the Supreme Court determined that reliance interests counseled against the 
overruling of Roe u. Wade. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at  2810-11. 
120. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-11; MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[3.-11, at  
50. 
121. Thus, in Casey, the Court determined that developments in constitutional 
law had not bypassed or undercut the doctrinal bases of Roe u. Wade. Casey, 112 
S. Ct. at 2810-11. 
On the other hand, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsodAmerican Express, 490 
U.S. 477 (1989), the Court determined that "the old judicial hostility to arbitration" 
that had formed the basis for the rule disallowing arbitration claims under the 
Securities A d  had been surpassed by current federal policy favoring arbitration. Id. 
a t  480-81; see also Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) (adopting implied 
warranty of habitability). 
122. Cf: Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09; MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[3.-11, at  
50. 
123. For example, when considering whether the central holding in Roe u. 
Wade had proved to be unworkable, the Court determined that it had not, for al- 
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After considering these factors, the court should determine 
whether they suggest upholding or overruling the prior deci- 
sion.'* If the court determines that these individual factors 
point towards overruling, it should weigh the decision t o  over- 
rule against the policies that underlie stare decisis, measuring 
the impact of overruling the prior case on those values. 
Consequently, the court should consider the decision t o  
overrule against the backdrop of the following values: 
1. Reliance: To what extent will overruling interfere with 
reasonably settled expectations or upset social relationships 
that have been formed in reliance on the rule? This consider- 
ation is especially weighty when commercial or property in- 
terests are inv01ved.l~~ 
2. Judicial economy and expedition: To what extent will a 
new rule lead to an increase in litigation, require increased 
expenditure of judicial resources, or otherwise burden the 
adjudicative process? 
3. The image of justice: Does a new rule promote or impair 
equal treatment? In overruling, will the court be seen to be 
just as  well as doing justice? Is the exercise of power legiti- 
mate?126 
If, after measuring the impact of overruling on the values 
counseling adherence, the court concludes that those values 
would not be unduly impaired, the court should overrule the 
prior decision. This process of weighing the necessity of over- 
though it required judicial involvement in determining whether state action in- 
fringed upon constitutional rights, this type of examination was well within the 
competency of the bench. Casq, 112 S. Ct. at 2809. 
As an additional overlay of caution, Professor Moore suggests that even if the 
court determines that the rule has proven unworkable, it should determine whether 
any rule would be "workable." See MOORE, supra note 33, ql 0.402[3.-11, at  50. 
124. As with most multi-prong tests, this test fails to suggest whether one 
prong is more determinative than another. In some cases, one factor alone may be 
determinative of the need to adhere or overrule; in others, all factors may point to 
the direction to be taken. 
125. To a great degree, this factor will have already been evaluated when the 
court proceeds through factors bearing on the decision to adhere or overrule. See 
supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. 
126. For example, it would be manifestly unjust to overrule merely because the 
court would have voted differently if the case had come before it initially. Casey, 
112 S. Ct. a t  2813-14. Likewise, frequent overruling undercuts the image of a just 
court doing justice. Id. at  2815 (stating that "frequent overruling would overtax the 
country's belief in the Court's good faith"). 
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ruling against its impact on values protected by adherence 
reconciles two possibly conflicting interests: the interest in 
promoting orderly administration of and continuity in  law and 
the interest in permitting the court of appeals to avoid unjust 
decisions without awaiting review of those precedents by the 
supreme court.12? 
Stare decisis jurisprudence thus allows a court to overrule 
its own precedents. The proposed "principled discretion" test 
protects both considerations that underlie stare decisis and the 
need for a court's ability to promote the growth of the common 
law. Consequently, one panel of the court of appeals should be 
able to overrule a prior decision of the court of appeals. 
A fundamental element of Anglo-American jurisprudence is 
the notion that the law should be stable, fostering equality and 
predictability of treatment. The judicial system achieves this 
stability through adherence to the common law doctrine of 
stare decisis. Pu t  simply, stare decisis requires tha t  a court 
apply its own precedents, a s  well as  those of courts to which i t  
owes obedience, when confronted with subsequent cases pre- 
senting similar issues. Adherence to this doctrine advances 
several substantial values: reliance on and stability in  the law, 
judicial economy, expeditious litigation, and, most fundamen- 
tally, equal treatment under the law. 
The doctrine of stare decisis has a double impact on the 
Utah Court of Appeals. As a n  intermediate appellate body, the 
court of appeals is strictly bound by the precedents of the court 
to which it owes obedience, the Utah Supreme Court. Further, 
although the court of appeals adjudicates cases as individual 
panels, the principle of stare decisis, as interpreted in  State v. 
T h ~ r r n a n , ' ~ ~  requires that  each panel follow decisions ren- 
dered by other panels of the court. 
However, stare decisis permits a court greater flexibility in 
treating its own, rather than a superior court's, past decis4ons. 
127. This exercise of principled discretion operates as a hndional equivalent of 
the requirement that a court should overrule a prior decision only when (i) there is 
a compelling reason to do so; and (ii) to do otherwise would work manifest injus- 
tice to the parties before the court. See, e.g., Opsal v. United Serv. Auto Ass'n, 283 
Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (1992); Denver Fire & Reporter Protection v. Dutton, 736 P.2d 
1255, 1256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); see also BLACK, supra note 33, a t  199. 
128. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). 
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Because the panels of the court of appeals function as one 
court, one panel may treat more flexibly another panel's deci- 
sion while retaining a consistency with stare decisis jurispru- 
dence. Consequently, a panel may limit and should be able to 
overrule a prior decision of the court when it is convinced that 
the decision is out of keeping with the current trend of the law 
and that the policies underlying stare decisis would not be 
offended. 
An understanding of these principles enables the court of 
appeals to avoid the pitfalls of either under- or over-applying 
its prior decisions. On the one hand, under-application of prece- 
dent produces inconsistent results, which frustrate the policies 
supported by stare decisis: reliance, stability, expedition, and 
equality of treatment. On the other hand, over-application of 
prior decisions-the refusal to abandon precedent-will limit 
the court's ability t o  develop the common law and deal justly 
with the parties before it. The analysis presented by this Com- 
ment will assist the court of appeals to identify and avoid both 
Scylla and Charybdis as it passes through the Straits of Stare 
Decisis. 
Paul W. Werner 
